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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to present a systematic analysis of the long-term behavior of the
agents of an artificial society under varying payoff functions in finite neighborhood binary games.
By assuming the linearity of the payoffs of both cooperating and defecting agents, the type of the
game is determined by four fundamental parameters. By fixing the values of three of them and
systematically varying the fourth one we can observe a transition from Prisoner's Dilemma to
Leader Game through Chicken and Benevolent Chicken Games. By using agent-based simulation
we are able to observe the long-term behavior of the artificial society with different and gradually
changing payoff structure. The difference between different games is explored and the effect of
the transition from one game to the other on the society is investigated. The results depend on the
personality types of the agents. In this study greedy and Pavlovian agents are considered. In the
first case, we observe the most significant change in trajectory structure between Prisoner's
Dilemma and Chicken Games showing significant difference in the behavioral patterns of the
agents. Almost no changes can be observed between Benevolent Chicken and Leader Games, and
only small change between Chicken and Benevolent Chicken. The trajectories change from always
converging to regularly oscillating patterns with systematically altering amplitude and central
values. The results are very similar whether the agents consider themselves as members of their
neighborhoods or not. With Pavlovian agents no significant difference can be observed between
the four games, the trajectories always converge and the limits smoothly and monotonically
depend on the value of the varying parameter.
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 Introduction
1.1
One of the most commonly used methods of investigating multiperson games is agent-based
simulation. There is a large literature (see for example Rapoport and Guyer 1966) on the different
types of games, the different types of behavior of the players in those games and how this
behavior affects the outcomes. The simplest games are those that are symmetric, in which the
players (or agents) have only two available choices and only the preference orderings of the
payoffs are taken into account. Rapoport and Guyer (1966) have shown that there are 57606/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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different types of such two-person games, or 78 if the players and their payoffs are interchanged.
In the case of N-person games, this number is much larger. It is assumed that the payoff for each
agent depends on the ratio of agents having a particular choice. If we call the choices cooperation
(C) and defection (D) and the number of cooperators among the N agents is k, then the payoff for
a cooperating agent is C(k/N) and that for a defecting agent is D(k/N) where C and D are real
valued functions in the unit interval [0, 1]. Therefore the outcome and the entire evolution of the
game depend on only the relative order of the values C(0),C(1/N), … ,C(N/N),D(0), D(1/N), …
,D(N/N). If no special condition is assumed about functions C and D, then there are (2N+2)!
possible orderings of these values, so this is the total number of possible game outcomes and
dynamic evolutions. If we assume that both functions C and D are strictly monotonic then the
orders of subsequences C(0),C(1/N), … ,C(N/N) and D(0), D(1/N), … ,D(N/N) are given, so there
are only   possibilities for mixing the two sequences. If we assume furthermore that
both functions are linear, then this number can be reduced. Merlone et al. (2007) discuss this case
and give a tight upper bound for this number. Similar situations occur if the payoffs of each agent
depend on the ratio of cooperators in a defined neighborhood about the agent. In this case N has
to be replaced by the number of agents located in the neighborhood. If both functions C and D are
linear (see Figure 1, where C(x)=(R-S)x+S and D(x)=(T-P)x+P), then the games are well defined by
the numbers P=D(0), T=D(1), S=C(0) and R=C(1).
Figure 1. Payoff functions
1.2
There are 4!=24 different orderings of these values which generate 24 different games. The most
frequently discussed game is the Prisoners' Dilemma, in which S<P<R<T. A comprehensive
summary of N-person Prisoners' Dilemmas is given in Szilagyi (2003) and a special simulation tool
designed for unlimited number of agents with user-defined parameters is introduced in Szilagyi
and Szilagyi (2000). There is also a large variety of behavior types of the agents. For some
particular types see for example, Helbing et al. (2000), Kitts (1999), Panzarasa et al. (2001) and
Panzarasa and Jennings (2001). A continuous time scale version of N-person prisoners' dilemma is
developed and analyzed in Zhao et al. (2007). Other game types are also frequently discussed in
the literature; however there has not been any attempt to the systematic analysis of the different
games as parameter values change. This analysis would show how one game evolves into another
game, how the outcomes and dynamic evolution of the games depend on the changing parameter
values and what happens at and around the boundary between two games. This structural analysis
can serve several purposes. It presents a systematic analysis of the transition between certain pairs06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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of games, shows the properties of the game at and around the border line between games, and
helps to design special parameter values to ensure desired behavioral patterns of the agents.
Moreover, the examination of the boundary region between two games provides similar
information than those obtained in the bifurcation theory of dynamic systems, which have
significant theoretical interest.
1.3
In this paper we will present the first attempt of such structural analysis. We selected four games,
the Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, Benevolent Chicken and Leader Games from the large set of
binary games. The reason for this choice is as follows. Szilagyi (2005) claims that a game can be
considered a dilemma only if reward for mutual cooperation is greater than the punishment for
mutual defection, but the temptation to defect, that is, defecting alone, gives the largest possible
outcome. Mathematically these conditions can be given as P<R<T. Fixing the values of P, R and T
and gradually changing the value of S we have 4 possibilities (excluding the border-line cases). If
S<P, then the game is the well-known Prisoners' Dilemma (Szilagyi 2003), if P<S<R, then it is
the Chicken Game (Szilagyi 2007). The case of R<S<T gives the Benevolent Chicken Game (Zizzo
2006) and if S>T, then we have the Leader Game (Guyer and Rapoport 1969). By using agent-
based simulation we will give a systematic description of the transformation of the game from
Prisoners' Dilemma to the Leader Game and present the characteristics of changing from one game
to another. Other cases can be examined in a similar way and they will be the subjects of our
future works. In this study we will concentrate mainly on the effect of neighborhood structure,
different updating strategy is also an interesting topic. For particular game classes it has been
already examined and known from the literature (see for example,Szilagyi 2003). The simulation
process and the computational results will be presented in the next two sections and final
conclusions will be outlined in Section 4.
 Simulation Methodology
2.1
We assume that the agents are distributed on and fully occupy a finite two-dimensional space. In
this study we select the integer points (i, j) with 1≤ i ≤100 and 1≤ j ≤100. Therefore the number
of agents is N=10,000. The neighborhood of each agent is given by one layer, so that an agent (k,
l) belongs to the neighborhood U(i, j) of agent (i, j), if and only if |k-i|≤1 and |l-j|≤1. Notice that
U(i, j) has 9 neighbors (including agent (i, j)) unless agent (i, j) is on the boundary. In this case U(i,
j) has 4 or 6 neighbors depending on whether agent (i, j) is located on a corner or not. We fix the
values of P=D(0)=0, R=C(1)=2 and T=D(1)=4 and systematically vary the value of S=C(0) from -
2 to 6. Only linear functions C and D are considered. Let x denote the ratio of cooperators in the
neighborhood of agent (i, j), then its payoff is C(x) if it is a cooperator, and D(x) if a defector. As it
was mentioned earlier, there are many possible behavior types of the agents. In our study we
assume a special adjustment process. At each time period t=0,1,2,…,T, the state of the system
consists of the choices (C or D) of the agents. Therefore there are 2N possible states of the
system. The dynamic process starts at a given initial state and its evolution depends on the
personality of the agents. In this paper, we will consider two types of personalities: greedy and
Pavlovian. A greedy agent always imitates the action of its neighbor with the highest reward. For a
Pavlovian agent, if its action is followed by a satisfactory state of affairs, then its tendency to
produce that particular action is reinforced. It is assumed first that all agents are greedy (Szilagyi
and Szilagyi 2000). At each time period t≥1, each agent (i, j) looks at the payoffs of all agents in its
neighborhood (including its own) and selects all those agents who received the highest payoff in
the previous time period. If the agent (i, j) is among them, then it keeps the same choice as
before. Otherwise it checks the previous choices of the best-awarded neighbors. If all of them had
different choice than agent (i, j), then this agent changes its choice to the best-awarded one,
otherwise it keeps the same choice what was its selection in the previous time period. Based on
this rule, all agents select new choices (by keeping or changing the previous choice) for the new
time period. This step is repeated for t=1,2,…,T, so complete choice-trajectories are obtained for
all agents and the ratio of cooperators x(t) can be computed at each time period t. Our main
concerns are the properties and possible convergence of sequence x(t). In the simulation study to
be described in the next section we will illustrate how these properties change if we gradually alter06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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the value of S=C(0) and show how transitions occur between different games. We will later briefly
discuss the case of Pavlovian agents.
 Simulation Results and Analysis
3.1
As mentioned earlier, we select linear functions for C and D with the fixed values of P=D(0)=0,
R=C(1)=2 and T=D(1)=4 and vary the value of S=C(0) from -2 to 6 with a small step size 0.01.
The initial state is defined by the initial ratio of cooperators x(0). The cooperating agents are
uniformly distributed in the given 100×100 grid according to the initial ratio. Figure 2 shows the
final ratios x(100) for the varying values of S and x(0). The patterns of the final ratios as functions
of S are very similar for different values of x(0).
3.2
If S<0, the game is the Prisoners' Dilemma, the trajectories x(t) converge immediately or after a
few iterations and the limit depends on the initial ratio of cooperators x(0). The effect of S on
converging limit is trivial. This is the case even at the boundary with the Chicken game (S=0). The
trajectories always converge to 0 when x(0) varies from 0 to a certain value below 0.7, however the
limit slightly increases if x(0) becomes larger; for example, it increases from 0.01 (or from 0.0016
depending on S) with x(0)=0.7017 to about 0.051 with x(0)=0.8991. Hence, in a society of only
greedy agents with one layer neighborhood, if the environment is for Prisoners' Dilemma, then
initial majority of defectors will lead the entire society to defection, while initial majority of
cooperators might stabilize the society with a small number of cooperators.
Figure 2. x(100) as a function of S with varying value of x(0)
3.3
For S>0 there is a gap: within the gap, the trajectory x(t) still behaves as Prisoners' Dilemma; after
the gap, there is a sudden change in the behavior of the trajectory. If x(0)=0.1, then the trajectory
behaves as in the case of Prisoners' Dilemma even for 0<S≤0.25, afterwards the trajectories start
oscillating as they should in Chicken Games. The gap keeps the same while x(0) increases until
x(0)=0.13. From x(0)=0.13 to x(0)=0.9, the gap is 0<S<0.01. After the gap the trajectories follow
the pattern of Chicken Games with oscillations. Figure 3 shows different oscillatory patterns with06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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S=0.01, 1.0 and 1.99 by selecting the initial value x(0)=0.9, and the comparison of these three
trajectories indicate that the frequency increases with larger value of S. Table 1 shows the
averages of the x(t) values of the last 20 iterations for different values of S and x(0). The elements
of the right most column are the calculated standard deviations of the specific rows (averaged x(t)
when S is fixed). The elements of the last row are the calculated standard deviations of the specific
columns (averaged x(t) when x(0) is fixed). By comparing these two types of standard deviations, it
can be observed that the effect of the initial ratio of cooperators to the final result is much smaller
than that of the value of S. It is also interesting to notice from the Table that when S is very close
to the value of P or R shown in Figure 1 (see the values of S=0.01, 0.1 and 0.2 and also S=1.8,
1.9 and 1.99), there is no change in the center of the trajectories for a certain range of S. For a
greedy agent's society, the one-layer neighborhood Chicken Game environment leads to
oscillatory patterns of the ratio of cooperators around a range from 29% to 39% with any initial
ratio x(0).
Table 1: The trajectory center of the last 20 iterations for different values of S and x(0)
S average of x std
x0=0.2031 x0=0.2999 x0=0.4 x0=0.5898 x0=0.7017 x0=0.7969 x0=0.8991
0.01 0.3309 0.305 0.3171 0.3142 0.3137 0.3183 0.3097 0.008128
0.1 0.3309 0.305 0.3171 0.3142 0.3137 0.3183 0.3097 0.008128
0.2 0.3309 0.305 0.3171 0.3142 0.3137 0.3183 0.3097 0.008128
0.3 0.3151 0.3195 0.3311 0.3189 0.3215 0.3226 0.3282 0.00554
0.4 0.3193 0.3073 0.3205 0.3063 0.3188 0.3119 0.3158 0.005841
0.5 0.2993 0.3001 0.2931 0.3116 0.2928 0.3011 0.2918 0.006929
0.6 0.2838 0.2846 0.2923 0.2919 0.2791 0.3023 0.2927 0.007663
0.7 0.3009 0.3064 0.3064 0.293 0.2988 0.2927 0.3013 0.005599
0.8 0.2929 0.2905 0.2941 0.2985 0.2905 0.2905 0.2897 0.003122
0.9 0.293 0.2905 0.2917 0.2985 0.294 0.2905 0.2877 0.003411
1 0.3157 0.3147 0.3152 0.3209 0.3137 0.3158 0.3216 0.003126
1.1 0.3468 0.347 0.3411 0.3457 0.3491 0.3448 0.3438 0.002571
1.2 0.3651 0.3531 0.3542 0.342 0.3548 0.3497 0.3618 0.007605
1.3 0.3612 0.3544 0.3592 0.3597 0.3577 0.3578 0.36 0.002213
1.4 0.3565 0.3594 0.364 0.3602 0.3565 0.3646 0.3626 0.003336
1.5 0.369 0.3695 0.3741 0.3723 0.3664 0.3697 0.3701 0.002458
1.6 0.3575 0.3571 0.3594 0.3609 0.3542 0.3593 0.3624 0.002697
1.7 0.384 0.3786 0.3867 0.3911 0.3834 0.3826 0.3782 0.004494
1.8 0.3909 0.3922 0.3889 0.3818 0.3852 0.3836 0.3899 0.003966
1.9 0.3909 0.3922 0.3889 0.3818 0.3852 0.3836 0.3899 0.003966
1.99 0.3909 0.3922 0.3889 0.3818 0.3852 0.3836 0.3899 0.003966
std 0.035286 0.037074 0.035114 0.033596 0.035327 0.033676 0.036484
3.4
Figure 4 shows some x(t) trajectories for both the Prisoners' Dilemma and the Chicken Game. The
initial value of x(0)=0.9 is selected and the trajectories for S=0.01 and some cases for S≤0 are
illustrated. The case S=0.01 is a Chicken Game with oscillating trajectories, all other cases behave
as they should in a Prisoners' Dilemma: they converge and the limit slightly changes in S.06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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Figure 3. Time series of x with different values of S (a)S=0.01 (b)S=1 (c)S=1.9906/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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Figure 4. Time series of the ratios of cooperators when S<0, S=0 and S=0.01
3.5
There is a different kind of transition between the Chicken Game and the Benevolent Chicken
Game around S=2. The transition gap is much larger than in the transition between Prisoners'
Dilemma and Chicken Game. For all the cases, the gap remains the same as [2, 2.28]. Inside the
gap the games behave like a Chicken Game, after the gap (when S>2.28) the oscillation continues
with two major differences. The frequency seems to be the same for all later values of S for both
the Benevolent Chicken and Leader Games. The amplitude has a decreasing tendency in S for the
Benevolent Chicken Game but an increasing tendency in the Leader Game after some initial steps.
These properties are illustrated in Figure 5, 6 and 7 with the values 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 for x(0). We
can also notice that there is no significant pattern change between the Benevolent Chicken and
Leader Games. Three particular trajectories are shown in Figure 8 for x(0)=0.1 and S=2.3, 4 and 6
comparing the last two games.06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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Figure 5. 3D plot of x as function of t and S, 2.3≤S≤6, x(0)=0.1
Figure 6. 3D plot of x as function of t and S, 2.3≤S≤6, x(0)=0.5
Figure 7. 3D plot of x as function of t and S, 2.3≤S≤6, x(0)=0.906/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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Figure 8. Comparison of time series patterns of x with different S values, x(0)=0.1
3.6
We have also performed the same series of computations by assuming that the agents do not
consider themselves as members of their neighborhoods. In all cases we had very similar results to
those presented earlier with the only difference that the boundaries between the different games
slightly move up.
3.7
In the previous experiments we have assumed greedy agents, when changes in the behaviors of
the agents were deterministic. We also repeated the computer study with Pavlovian agents. Here
the behavior of each agent changes according to a well defined probabilistic rule. If P(t) denotes
the probability of cooperation by a given agent at time t, then probability changes in time as:
(1)
While in the case of greedy agents all trajectories are deterministic, in the case of Pavlovian agents
they are random, since the behavior of the agents is determined by the probability values (1). Each
simulation can produce different trajectory, therefore we made 16 runs with identical P(0)=0.5 for
all agents and computed the average values of the x(t) ratios for all t. If x*(t) denotes the "true"
expectation and xaverage(t) the average value computed from NS simulation runs, then from the
Chebyshev inequality we know that with any ε>0,
(2)
where σ2(t) is the variance of the x(t) values. In our case σ2(t) was approximated by the sample
variance, which was very small, less than 10-6, since the different simulation runs were very06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
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similar. Notice that we had 10,000 agents, therefore, the relative frequencies were calculated from
a very large sample size. The values of x(t) are then accurate for at least 2 decimal figures with
99.9% probability.
3.8
In the simulation we selected α=β=0.1. The trajectories for x(t) are very similar for all of the four
games. Figure 9 summarizes the average trajectories for -2≤S≤6 and 0≤t≤50, from which a clear
convergence can be noticed in all cases. It is also noticeable that the limit is increasing and very
smooth in S.
Figure 9. 3D plot of x as function of t and S, agents are Pavlovian
 Conclusions
4.1
In this paper we presented a first attempt of the systematic analysis of N-person finite
neighborhood binary games. Linear payoff functions, C and D, were considered and it was
assumed that they depend on the ratio of cooperators in the one-layer neighborhood of the
agents. All agents were first assumed to be greedy. By fixing three parameters (D(0), D(1) and
C(1)), the fourth parameter, C(0), was gradually increased giving transitions from Prisoners'
Dilemma to Leader Game through Chicken and Benevolent Chicken games.
4.2
The largest change in trajectory patterns was observed between Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken
Game, almost no change between Benevolent Chicken and Leader Games, and a small change
between Chicken and Benevolent Chicken Games. There was always a small interval of the varying
parameter after the border line, in which the trajectory had the characteristics of the previous
game. We could also observe how the properties of oscillating trajectories depend on the varying
parameter value.
4.3
In this study we assumed that the agents consider themselves as members of their neighborhoods.
We repeated the simulation study when the agents are excluded from their neighborhoods. Only06/30/2007 11:00 PM Jijun Zhao, Ferenc Szidarovszky and Miklos N. Szilagyi: Finite Neighborhood Binary Games
Page 11 of 12 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/10/3/3.html
slight differences could be observed in comparison to the previous case.
4.4
We also repeated the experiments with Pavlovian agents. There was no difference in the trajectory
patterns, they always converged, and the limit changed as the model parameter was varied. This
dependence was smooth and monotonic.
4.5
In this paper we considered and examined only a small portion of the possible cases of sensitivity
analysis, when systematically varying parameter values change the type of the game and therefore
the long-term evolution of the artificial society. We analyzed only the transition from Prisoner's
Dilemma to Leader Game through Chicken and Benevolent Chicken games, however our future
research will focus on examining the transitions between other game classes.
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